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Abstract Aim of the present paper is to provide a formal characterization of
various different notions of responsibility within groups of agents (Who did that?
Who gets the blame? Who is accountable for that? etc.). To pursue this aim, the
papers proposes an organic analysis of organized collective agency by tackling the
issues of organizational structure, role enactment, organizational activities, task-
division and task-allocation. The result consists in a semantic framework based on
dynamic logic in which all these concepts can be represented and in which various
notions of responsibility find a formalization. The background motivation of the
work consists in those responsibility-related issues which are of particular interest
for the theory and development of multi-agent systems.
Keywords Deontic logic  Multi-agent systems  Organizational structure 
Responsibility
1 Introduction
The concept of responsibility is central to a theory of collective agency and
organizations. Responsibility issues arise any time a group of agents acts
collectively in order to achieve certain objectives. Plans are made for the collective
D. Grossi  F. Dignum










Artif Intell Law (2007) 15:223–249
DOI 10.1007/s10506-007-9054-0
action of the group and specific agents are stated to be ‘‘responsible’’ for certain
tasks. If something goes wrong certain agents might be found ‘‘responsible’’ for
what happened, they might be held ‘‘accountable’’ and be ‘‘blamed’’. The notion of
responsibility displays different nuances all related with particular aspects of
collective agency and, predominantly, obligation and knowledge.
The way obligations and knowledge flow within groups of agents is in turn
related with the organizational structure those groups display. The possibility to
delegate tasks to subordinated agents, or to successfully inform other agents about
the actual state of the organization, or the possibility to put effective monitoring and
recovery mechanisms in place are all aspects influencing the assessment of
responsibilities within organizations. If an agent is appointed to perform a specific
task, but it does not get the necessary knowledge for correctly performing it, can it
be held responsible for a failure in the execution of the plan? And in what sense
precisely is it responsible? Again, if an agent is appointed to a task but it delegates it
to a subordinated agent, does the failure of the subordinated agent determines a form
of responsibility for the first agent? And in what sense? The paper proposes a formal
analysis for grounding rigorous answers to this type of questions. The main thesis of
the work consists in claiming that responsibility issues within groups of agents are
essentially related with the way groups are organized in order to pursue their
objectives. In a nutshell, the less a group of agents is organized, the more blurred
becomes the assessment of responsibilities within the group.
To provide a formal understanding of responsibility issues within groups of agents
is of definite importance for the theory and development of multi-agent systems
(MAS). In fact, many methodologies for MAS, like for instance GAIA (Wooldridge
et al. 2000) are based on organizational concepts as their cornerstones. A formal
theory of responsibility would provide these methodologies with conceptual tools for
interpreting, in organizational terms, faulty performances of a given MAS, and at the
same time suggest guidelines for the design of MAS behaving in specific ways with
respect to the assessment of responsibilities among the agents.
In order to provide the desired analysis we consider various ingredients that make
a collective agency an organized collective agency. In particular, we will consider
the way the objectives of the group of agents are translated into concrete plans via
task division and task allocation and the type of organizational structure in force
within the group. With respect to these notions the present paper builds on previous
work we presented in (Grossi et al. 2004, 2005).
The paper is structured according to the following outline. In Sect. 2 the notion of
organizational structure is extensively discussed and the analytical perspective
presented in Grossi et al. (2005) is summarized. A first informal description of the
notions of responsibility we are interested in is also provided. In Sect. 3 we
introduce the language we are going to use and present its formal semantics. This
section expands on the work presented in Grossi et al. (2004). Then, in Sect. 4.1, a
formal semantics of the basic organizational activities of delegating, informing and
monitoring is presented. In the same section a thorough analysis of the notion of
plan as intended in this work is exposed. Section 5 provides a formalization of some
notions of responsibility and their logical relations with the notion of organizational
structures is studied by means of some propositions. In Sect. 6 similarities and
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differences with some related work are discussed and finally, in Sect. 7, some
concluding remarks follow.
2 Informal preliminaries
2.1 Organizational structure and organizational activities
Organizational structures are sets of relations between the roles of an organization.
A typical abstract example of such structures is the so-called ‘‘vertical differen-
tiation’’ or ‘‘authority structure’’ of organizations, usually considered to be a
‘‘hierarchy’’ structure. These abstract types of structures are traditionally studied in
the branch of sociology known as mathematical sociology (Fararo 1997; Sørensen
1978).
Work on organizations (especially in MAS1) presents organizational structure as
something essentially mono-dimensional, though it often, but only implicitly,
considers a multiplicity of structured aspects: authority, communication, delegation,
responsibility, control, power, etc. The thesis we hold here, which is inspired by
foundational work on social and organization theory like Selznick (1948),
Morgenstern (1951) and Giddens (1984), is that organizations do not exhibit one
single structural dimension, but that they are instead multi-structured objects. In
particular, we view organizational structure as hiding at least three relevant
dimensions which we call: power, coordination and control.
These different structural dimensions are linked with as many specific activities
that take place within any organized group of agents acting to pursue some goals.
These activities, which we call organizational activities, consists in ‘‘managing the
interdependencies between the activities’’ (Decker and Lesser 1995) of the group. In
other words they guarantee the group ‘to act in an organized way’. We will analyze
three of these activities: delegation, information and monitor, each of them related
with one specific structural dimension. The delegation activity, concerning the flow
of obligations within an organization is related with the structural dimension of
power. The information activity, concerning instead the flow of knowledge within
the group of agents, is related with the coordination dimension. Finally, the
monitoring activity, concerning the recovery functionalities of the organization, is
related with the control dimension.
As a result of this analysis, organizations will be represented as explicitly
displaying a triple structure constrained on the basis of the interplay between the
three notions of power, coordination, and control (see Definition 3.1). Although we
do not pretend to give full definitions of these relations, we will characterize these
relations in terms of the consequences they bear for the performance of
organizational activities. In a nutshell, our thesis is that organizational structure
makes organizational activities possible, that is, what organizational structure does
is to make it possible for a group of agents to act as an organization (see Sect. 4.1).
Let us thus have a closer look to what we called organizational activities. A quote
from Selznick (1948) provides interesting hints:
1 See (Horling and Lesser (2004) for an exhaustive survey.
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‘‘Delegation is the primordial organizational act, a precarious venture which
requires the continuous elaboration of formal mechanisms of coordination and
control’’.
In fact, delegation concerns the redistribution of tasks within an organization. To
realize their objective organizations needs to attribute tasks to agents according to
specific plans for the realization of those objectives (see Sect. 4.4). Delegation
introduces a dynamic within this attribution of tasks transferring tasks from agents to
agents when the recipient of the transfer plays a somehow subordinated role within
the organization. The transfer takes place in the form of a directed obligation
(Dignum 1999) of the agent enacting the first role to the agent enacting the
subordinated one. This second agent is thus obliged to perform a task which belonged
to the first agent. The possibility of delegating goals constitutes one of the essential
aspects of organizations. The power structure concerns exactly the channels through
which this task flow can take place: ‘‘who can (successfully) delegate to whom?’’
The quote from Selznick (1948) mentioned above emphasizes the importance of
the coordination and control issues within organized groups. In particular, every
organization has to handle the knowledge problem concerning the state of the
organization itself (or of part of it2) at a given moment. Agents should know when
to act, that is, they should be informed about the status of the activities of the
organization on which their activities depend3, and what they are obliged to do. As
we observed above, delegation introduces dynamics in the task distribution of an
organization. The point is that once a task is delegated and a correspondent
obligation arises for a specific agent, a certain amount of information might be
required for that agent to include that task in its own goal base and to pursue it.
Because of this, an information mechanism which can keep track of this dynamics is
crucial for the performance of an organization. To quote Morgenstern (1951):
‘‘The description of a delegation system [power structure] is incomplete
unless the simultaneous signaling system [coordination structure] applied to it
is also explicitly described’’.
The coordination structure should then guarantee that each agent has a represen-
tation of the actual state of the organization which is sufficient for it to accomplish
its tasks. The question is then how the access and sharing of information is
structured within the organization: who can (successfully) inform whom?
Objectives and norms also determine to a great extent the control structure. Since
agents’ tasks can be accomplished or not, the monitoring activity is an indispensable
activity in which any organization has to engage. This is the case also for MAS
2 Notice, in passing, that the amount of knowledge to be propagated through the organization also
constitutes an important issue:
‘‘If every competence [role] had full information about every other it might help but not
necessarily; it would clearly be wasteful, if not physically impossible, for most organizations’’
(Morgenstern 1951).
3 This issue has been formally investigated in Grossi et al. (2004).
226 D. Grossi et al.
123
organizations where agents, even if ‘‘benevolent’’, are anyway subjected to the
possibility of failure. In its simplest form, control consists in a monitoring activity
triggering appropriate reactions to determinate failures or violations. If an agent
fails in performing one of the stated or delegated tasks, a kind of supervisor agent
should engage in the performance of that task: organization calls for a form of
supervision activity (Giddens 1984). Because of this, control can be seen as ‘‘an
organization within an organization’’ (Morgenstern 1951). With respect to the
control issue the relevant structural question is: who can (successfully) monitor
whom?
Besides the activities of delegation, information and control, and their correlated
organizational structures, a range of yet more activities can be isolated which play a
crucial role within organized agency. One of them concerns the distribution of the
necessary capabilities within the organization for agents to perform the required
tasks. Such issue is somehow analogous to the information issue since it concerns
requirements each tasks presupposes in order to be accomplished. A basic type of
capabilities lies in the amount of resources that agents should have at their disposal.
A second kind of capabilities plays a central role in organizations, namely those
concerning the so-called institutional power (Jones and Sergot 1996; Castelfranchi
2003). Again the problem is related with the dynamics introduced by the delegation
activity: delegating a task may require a parallel enabling or empowering activity
such as making the relevant resources accessible, e.g., electronic money, and
providing the required form of institutional empowerment, e.g., a suitable
document. In this case the relevant structural question is: who can (successfully)
enable or empower whom? We choose however not to complicate matters further
and we assume in this work that all agents have the capabilities needed to perform
the tasks they are appointed to.
2.2 Notions of responsibility: a sketch
The analysis of organizational structures concerns organizations at their role level.
Responsibilities, instead, concern agents and arise in relation with task-allocation
and structure once there are agents enacting the roles of a given organization.
Given a task-allocation allocating a specific subtask to a role, and given that an
agent is enacting that role, the agent is then said to be responsible for that task or
task-based responsible. In other words, the allocation of subtasks to roles
determines a distribution of what we call task-based responsibilities over the set
of agents enacting the roles of the organization. Task-based responsibilities can also
arise via delegation under a power link or of a monitoring action under a control
link. Thanks to a power structure an agent can appoint a new task to a subordinated
agent and because of a control structure a monitoring agent can happen to be
appointed to a task whose accomplishment failed.
Being autonomous, agents can independently decide whether to perform the
subtasks to which they are appointed or not, and whether to perform them in the
expected way. In this case the fulfillment of the organizational objectives is put in
jeopardy by the conduct of some agent that is said then to be causally responsible
for the failure occurred.
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In organizations an agent can happen to be causally responsible of some failure
without actually being accountable for that in the eyes of the organization. This can
happen if an agent which is task-based responsible for performing a task, delegates the
performance to a subordinate agent which fails to execute the delegated task. The second
agent is causally responsible for the failure but it is the delegating agent that will be held
accountable for the failure since it was the one appointed to the task in the first place.
The notion of accountability eminently reveals an interplay between the notions
of responsibility isolated above, and dimensions of social structure such as the
possibility to delegate allocated tasks, i.e., what we called power relation in the
previous section. The presence of a power structure within an organization causes a
difference between the two notions of task-based and causal responsibility: ‘I may
have not performed the task you delegated to me, but you were the one appointed to
it’. However, this is not the only case in which a given organizational bears
consequences for the assessment of responsibilities within a group. As we have seen
in the previous section organizational structure influences also the flow of
knowledge within an organization and knowledge is an essential ingredient of yet
another way of ‘‘being responsible’’ for something, namely, blameworthiness. An
agent can be causally responsible for a failure without actually being blameworthy
for that. This is the case, for instance, if it just was not informed about the task it
was supposed to perform. The acknowledgment of such a gap calls for the
distinction of yet another meaning of the notion of responsibility which we call
blameworthiness.
All the informal notions of responsibility just sketched are formalized in Sect. 5.
3 A semantic framework for organized action
The framework we are going to present develops the logic for collective agency
presented in Grossi et al. (2004) and which in turn built on Royakkers (1998). The
key idea consists in enabling the possibility to formalize not only notions
concerning the activity of groups of agents, but also notions concerning the activity
of organized groups of agents, that is to say of groups of agents displaying some
form of organizational structure.
Technically, the framework will handle event expressions, that is expressions
about the performance of some action by some agents, and their composition,
epistemic expressions, deontic expressions concerning event expressions (and thus
ought-to-do types of deontic notions), and predicates on events. The framework
expands the proposal contained in Grossi et al. (2004) in one essential direction,
namely, adding special propositions for describing organizational structures. These
will denote the existence of power coordination and control links between roles,
intuitively, that a role is under the power of another role, that a role can coordinate
with another role, finally, that a role can control another role.
3.1 Language LORG
The alphabet of LORG consists first of all of a set of agent identifiers Ag (groups of
agents identifiers are denoted by X; Y; . . .), and a set AR of roles identifiers. The set
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P of propositional symbols (p) of LORG contains at least the propositional constant V
(violation) and all organizational structure propositions, that is, for any r; s 2 AR
and i 2 Ag: Power(r, s) (there exists a power-link between r and s), Coord(r, s)
(there exists a coordination-link between r and s), Control(r, s) (there exists a
control-link between r and s) and rea(i, r) (the agent denoted by i enacts the role
denoted by r). Besides, LORG contains a set A of atomic action symbols typically
denoted by a,4 the family of epistemic operators fKigi2Ag (‘‘agent i knows that ...’’),
the dynamic operator [ ] (‘‘after each execution of ... it holds that’’), the LTL (linear
time temporal logic) operators @start (‘‘it holds at the initial state of the run’’), @1
(‘‘it holds at the previous state of the run’’) and @+1 (‘‘it holds at the next state of
the run’’) and the operator DO denoting what event is going to happen next. The set
A of atomic actions contains at least the ‘‘do nothing’’ action expression skip and
all organizational action expressions, that is: delegateði; aÞ (delegating action a to
agent i), informði; /Þ (informing agent i that / is the case), monitorði; aÞ
(monitoring the execution of action a by agent i) with i 2 Ag, / 2 LORG and a 2 A.
The language L is based on three types of syntactic constructs that we are now
going to define.
The set Act of action expressions (a) is defined through the following BNF:
a ::¼ a j skip j a j a1 þ a2 j a1&a2 j a1; a2;
where skip represents a ‘‘doing nothing‘‘ action, the overline stands for the event
negation operator, + stands for the indeterministic choice operator, & for the parallel
performance operator and ; for the sequencing operator.
The set Evt of event expressions (n) is defined through the following BNF:
n ::¼ X : a j X : a jn1 þ n2 j n1&n2 j n1; n2:
Notice that the same notation for actions and event operators (negation, +, &, ;) is
used. It is nevertheless obvious that they belong to different categories of operators.
Notice finally that event expressions consist of an action expression (a) plus an
index denoting a group of agents (X). Events performed by individuals should be
indexed via singletons ({a}), however, in order to keep the notation light, we will
often omit the singleton notation.
A subset of Evt is of particular interest for our purposes, that is the set of events
of the form X : a such that X is a singleton and a is an organizational action in A.
We call this set of events OrgEvt, i.e., organizational events.
The set Ass of assertions ð/Þ is defined through the following BNF:
/ ::¼p j V j DOðnÞ j :/ j /1 ^ /2 j ½n/ j Ki/ j @start/ j @1/
@þ1/ j reaðr; iÞ j Powerðr; sÞ j Coordðr; sÞ j Controlðr; sÞ;
where i 2 Ag and r; s 2 AR. The other boolean connectives can be defined as usual.
4 In order to keep the notation as light as possible we will often omit the underlining, when this does not
cause any ambiguity.
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3.2 Models
With LORG we want to be able to talk about a number of different notions and in
particular: organizational structures, hypothetical performances of actions by agents
(i.e., events and their combinations in plans) and actual performances of actions by
agents resulting in a run of the agent system. Our models should thus be rich enough
to give a precise semantics to all these ingredients.
To model organizational structures we make use of the theory of directed graphs.
However, we introduce only some basic elements of it which are strictly of use for
the development of the article.5
Definition 3.1 (Organizational structures) An organizational structure OS is a
tuple:
Roles [ Agents; RPower; RCoord; RControl; Reah i
where Roles [ Agents is the finite set of roles and agents of the organization, and
RPower, RCoord, RControl are three irreflexive binary relations on Roles characterizing
the Power, Coordination and Control structures. Rea is a subset of Agents · Roles
and indicates which agents play which roles. It is called role enactment
configuration (or role adoption configuration).
The notion of organizational structure is an essential ingredient of the models for
LORG. They are defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Models) A model M is a structure:
M ¼ PþðAgentsÞ;A [ skip;W; ½½ R; fKigi2Agents; run; p; OS; J
D E
where:
– PþðAgentsÞ is the non-empty powerset of the finite set of actors Agents, that
means the possible groups of actors.
– A [ skip is the set of actions.
– W is the set of possible states.
– ½½ R is a function f s.t. f : Evt W ! PðWÞ, to each event expression-world
couple it associates the set of states to which the performance of that event in
that world leads. It consists of a composition of the two functions ½½  and R
which will be introduced in Sect. 3.3.
– fKigi2Agents is a family of reflexive symmetric and transitive accessibility
relations which are indexed by actors indicating the accessible worlds
representing the epistemic alternatives of agent ai.
– run is a structure run ¼ W0;h i modeling an actual run of the agent system and
such that:
• W0 denotes the set of states of W reached by the run (W0 W);
5 For comprehensive expositions we refer the reader to Harary et al. (1965), Harary (1969) and Ross and
Wright (1992).
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•  is a finite path of length n on W0 (a sequence w1; . . . ; wnþ1h i of distinct
elements of W0 s.t. 8wi1  i  n, wi  wiþ1) denoting the order in which
worlds are reached in the run through actual performances of events. Path 
has therefore always a first and a last state. We denote the first state of the
run as wstart.
The ordering  is constrained as follows: (a) if w1  w2 then hw1; w2i 2 ½½nR for
some n 2 Evt; (b) if w1  w2 and 9w3 s.t. w3Kiw1 or w3Kiw2 then w3Kiw2 and
w3Kiw1. From an intuitive point of view, the first condition states that the run
happens always through transitions that are labeled by some event, and the second
condition guarantees the whole path of actual performances through W to be
epistemically accessible.
– p is a usual truth function p : Ass  W ! f1; 0g
– OS is an organizational structure (Definition 3.1).
– J ¼ Ja; Jrh i where Ja : Ag ! Agents, i.e., Ja is a function that maps agent
names into agents, and Jr : AR ! Roles, i.e., Jr is a function that maps role
names into the corresponding roles.
Like in Meyer (1988) and Dignum et al. (1996) our semantics consists of two parts:
first event expressions are interpreted as set theoretic constructs onAwhere events get
a so-called open interpretation; successively event expressions are interpreted as
state-transition functions determining the accessibility relation ½½ R onW.
3.3 Synchronicity sets, steps, synchronicity traces, and worlds
The interpretation of events is based on the basic notion of synchronicity set (s-set).
Definition 3.3 (s-set) The set S of s-sets is defined as follows
S ¼ PþðAgentsÞ  fskipg [ PþðAgentsÞ  PþðAÞ.
Synchronicity sets, that is elements of S, are denoted by S1; S2; . . .. Informally, a
s-set is nothing but a set of parallel executions of events by a group of agents, and
formalizes the aforementioned open interpretation view on events. We will often
refer to s-sets by making the group of agents explicit in an index (e.g. SX). Based on
the notion of s-set we define the notion of step.6
Definition 3.4 (Step) The set Step of steps is defined as follows:
Step ¼ffSXgX2PþðAgentsÞ j 8X 2 PþðAgentsÞ : SX 2 S
& 8X; Y 2 PþðAgentsÞ :
Y  X ) actðSYÞ  actðSXÞ
& 8X; Y 2 PþðAgentsÞ :
actðSYÞ ¼ skip ) actðSX[YÞ ¼ actðSXÞg
6 Notice that in Dignum et al. (1996) s-sets are called steps, and no notion of step as it will be defined in
this work occurs there.
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where act is a function that extracts the action component from a given s-set (act(X:
{a1, a2}) = {a1, a2}).
Steps represent a sort of snapshot of the activity of each subgroup of Agents at a
certain moment, depicting how all agents move one ‘‘step‘‘ ahead. Steps are
therefore sets of s-sets of cardinality 2n1 where n is the number of agents in
Agents. They are constrained in such a way that whatever action is performed by a
subgroup is also performed by a supergroup, and subgroups remaining inactive are
treated as performing a skip action. Steps, that is elements of Step, are denoted by
st1; st2; . . ..
In order to provide a semantics for sequential expressions the concept of
synchronicity trace (s-trace) is needed. Notice that this concept uses steps instead of
s-sets like it was originally defined in Meyer (1988).
Definition 3.5 (s-trace) The set T of s-traces is defined as follows:
T ¼ f st1; . . . ; stn; . . .h ijst1; . . . ; stn; . . . 2 Stepg:
The length of an s-trace t is denoted by dur(t). We assume dur(t) to be finite.
An event will be interpreted as a set of s-traces. The range for our interpretation
of events is a set E such that E ¼ PðT Þ. Elements of E (sets of s-traces) are denoted
as T1; T2; . . .. The length dur(T) of a set T is defined as maxfdurðtÞjt 2 Tg.
We can now introduce the operations that constitute the semantic counterpart of
our syntactic operators.
Definition 3.6 (Operations on events) Let T1; T2 2 T :
T1  T2 ¼ft1  t2 j t1 2 T1; t2 2 T2g
T1eT2 ¼
[
ft1et2 j t1 2 T1; t2 2 T2g
T1dT2 ¼T1 [ T2 n
[
ft1et2 j t1 2 T1; t2 2 T2 and t1 6¼ t2g
~T ¼ if T 6¼ ;;
~T ¼ ef ~st j st 2 Tg
if T ¼ ;; ~T ¼ Step
(
where
– t1  t2 is defined as follows: if t1 ¼ st1; . . . ; stnh i and t2 ¼ st01; . . . ; st0m
 
then,
t1  t2 ¼ st1; . . . ; stn; st01; . . . ; st0m
 
.
– t1et2 is defined as follows: t1et2 ¼
t1 if t2 2 startðt1Þ




where start is a function which associates to a given s-trace all its starting
possible s-traces: startðtÞ ¼ ft0 j t0 ¼ t or 9t00 6¼ ; s.t. t0  t00 ¼ tg .
– If t ¼ st1; . . . ; stnh i then ~t is defined as follows:





st1; . . . ; ~stnh i
where ~st ¼ Step  fstg.7.
Intuitively, we want d to yield the property: a 	 a þ a; b for event expressions.
In order to establish this property we cannot just use a union of the sets of s-traces
representing a and a;b but have to do some ‘‘cleaning up‘‘ by subtracting
superfluous parts.
The semantics of events are obtained by means of a function ½½  : Evt ! E such
that:
Definition 3.7 (Semantics of events)
½½X : a ¼fst 2 Step j st ¼ SX ; a 2 actðSXÞg
½½n1; n2 ¼½½n1  ½½n2




The basic clause stipulates that the meaning of an atomic event consists of the set
of steps where that action at least is performed by that specific group of agents.
On the basis of this evaluation for events, an evaluation of groups performing
complex actions is obtained:
Definition 3.8 (Semantics of collective actions)
½½X : a1; a2 ¼½½X : a1  ½½X : a2
½½X : a1 þ a2 ¼½½X : a1d½½X : a2
½½X : a1&a2 ¼½½X : a1e½½X : a2
½½X : a ¼½½X : a:
To connect this interpretation of events to a possible world semantics a function
R : E W !W is defined, which couples events with state-transitions.
Definition 3.9 (Function R) RðT ; w1Þ ¼ fw2 j 9t 2 T s:t: w2 ¼ Rðt; w1Þg where R
on transitions is inductively defined as follows:
Rðst1; w1Þ ¼reachðst1; w1Þ
Rðt1  t2; w1Þ ¼Rðt2; Rðt1; w1ÞÞ
7 Negation of sequences constitutes a delicate matter. For a deeper discussion of this issue we refer to
Dignum and Meyer (1990).
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function reach : Step W !W being a function that, given a state, returns the
following states reachable through a given step, and such that




The meaning of formulae / in a world w, given the structure M, is defined as usual.
We report here only the clauses for the organizational structure propositions, the
epistemic, dynamic and temporal operators, and the DO operator.
Definition 3.10 (Satisfaction relation) In the following let durð½½n1Þ ¼ 1,
M; w 
Powerðr; sÞ iff RPowerðJðrÞ; JðsÞÞ
M; w 
Coordðr; sÞ iff RCoordðJðrÞ; JðsÞÞ
M; w 
Controlðr; sÞ iff RControlðJðrÞ; JðsÞÞ
M; w 
reaða; rÞ iff ReaðJðaÞ; JðrÞÞ
M; w1 
½n/ iff 8w2 2 ½½nRðw1Þ : M; w2 
 /
M; w1 
Ka/ iff 8w2; w1Kaw2 : M; w2 
 /
M; w 
@start/ iff M; wstart 
 /
M; w1 
@1/ iff 9w2 2W; w2  w1 : M; w2 
 /
M; w1 
@þ1/ iff 9w2 2W; w1  w2 : M; w2 
 /
M; w1 
DOðn1Þ iff 8w2 2W; w1  w2 ) w1 2 ½½n1Rw2
M; w1 
DOðn1; nÞ iff 8w2 2W; w1  w2 ) ðM; w2 
 DOðnÞ and M; w1 

Informally rea assertions are an isomorphic representation within the language of
the Rea relation in OS. The same holds for Power, Coord and Control assertions. As
to the dynamic operator, a sentence ½n/ is true in w iff / is true in every world
accessible through a performance of n. The semantics of @start, @1 and @þ1 is quite
simple and it is just based on the  path contained in M. As to the semantics of
DO(n), the two clauses should be read as a basis and an induction step: intuitively, a
sentence DO(n) is evaluated as true in a world w1 iff state w2 in the run can be
reached via the sequence n of events. Notice that a backward looking operator
DONE, denoting what event took place in order to reach the present state, can be
defined as follows: DONEðnÞ :¼ @1DOðnÞ. In what follows we will thus
sometimes use DONE-expressions as abbreviations for @1DOðnÞ.
3.5 Deontic notions
Essential for our purposes is the possibility to express a notion of obligation, in
particular of obligation for a group of agents to execute a given plan. We express
deontic notions making use of a reduction strategy in the classical fashion of Meyer
(1988).
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Definition 3.11 (Deontics) The deontic operator for obligation O is defined as
follows:
OðnÞ 	 ½nV
For an extensive account the type of deontic logic generated by this reduction we
refer to Royakkers (1998). As shown in Grossi et al. (2004), the reduction makes the
formulae in Table 1 valid.
4 Organizational actions and organizational structure
4.1 Semantics of organizational actions
In Sect. 2 we have informally touched upon a number of activities that typically take
place within an organized group of agents: delegation, information, monitor. In
what follows we give a formal semantics of these activities, aiming at capturing
some of their essential features. We do not consider our analysis, however, to
exhaust all the aspects involved in the notions of delegation, control and monitor
within organizations. Our aim is rather to capture those aspects that look more
relevant in relation with the notions of responsibility which have been introduced in
Sect. 2 and which are formally investigated in Sect. 5.
Essentially, the semantics we propose formalizes the connection between the
organizational structures of power, coordination and control and the organizational
activities of delegation, information and monitor. The existence of structural links
between roles guarantees the successful performance of those organizational actions.
In other words, in order for a group of agents to act in an organized way, that is, to be
able to manage their collective endeavors, specific structures between the roles are
necessary in order to guarantee the effectiveness of organizational activities.
If a power relation holds between roles r and s, all delegation acts performed by an
agent a enacting role r on agents enacting role s succeed in creating an obligation for
these agents. Analogously, if a coordination relation holds between roles r and s, all
information acts performed by agents enacting role r to agents enacting role s are
successful in the sense that they create knowledge in these agents. Finally, if a control
relation holds between roles r and s, all monitoring acts performed by agents enacting
role r on agents enacting role s do not only create knowledge in the controller about the
Table 1 Some validities
concerning deontic notions
OðX [ Y : cÞ ! OðX : cÞ (1)
OðX : cÞ ! OðX [ Y : cÞ (2)
OðX : c1 þ Y : c1Þ ! OðX [ Y : cÞ (3)
OðX : c1 & Y : c2Þ ! OðX [ Y : c1&c2Þ (4)
OðX : c1 ; Y : c2Þ ! OðX [ Y : c1; c2Þ (5)
OðX : a1 & Y : a2Þ $ OðX : a1Þ ^ OðY : a2Þ (6)
OðX : a1 ; Y : a2Þ $ OðX : a1Þ ^ ½X : a1OðY : a2Þ (7)
OðX : a1Þ _ OðY : a2Þ ! OðX : a1 þ Y : a2Þ (8)
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relevant state of affairs, but they also determine an obligation for the controller in case
the controlled agent did not perform the action that is monitored.
Definition 4.1 (Semantic constraints for a: delegate(b,a)) For any step st and s-set
S such that a : delegateðb; aÞ 2 actðSÞ and S 2 st (with a; b 2 Ag and a 2 Act) and
any w 2 W:
reachðst; wÞ ¼
fw0 j w0 2 reachðst0; wÞ and M; w0 
 Oðb : aÞg
if M; w 
 KaOða : aÞ and M; w 
 Powerðr; sÞ




where st0 is the step obtained from st removing all occurrences of a : delegateðb; aÞ
from each of its s-sets.
Intuitively, if a power relation exists between roles that are enacted by two agents
and the delegating agent about knows the to-be-delegated obligation, then a delegate
action has as effect an obligation for the recipient. A delegate action implements
therefore, given an appropriate power link, a form of ‘‘your wish is my command’’
principle.
More technically, the definition states that, provided that the preconditions in the
first clause hold, the set of state-transitions generated by a step st where event
a : delegateðb; aÞ is performed, is the subset of the state-transitions generated by the
step st0 where no a : delegateðb; aÞ takes place in which all transitions end up
satisfying O(b: a). In other words what delegate actions do, with respect to all the
other actions being performed in the step, is just creating obligations, given that the
necessary preconditions hold. If the preconditions do not hold, then it is as if the
action was never performed (this is the intuitive meaning of the ‘‘otherwise’’
clause).
Definition 4.2 (Semantic constraints for a : informðb; /Þ) For any step st and s-set
S such that a : informðb; /Þ 2 S and S 2 st (with a; b 2 Ag and a 2 Act) and any
w 2 W:
reachðst; wÞ ¼
fw0 j w0 2 reachðst0; wÞ and M; w0 
 Kb/g
if M; w 
 Ka@þ1/ and M; w 
 Coordðr; sÞ




where st0 is the step obtained from st removing all occurrences of a : informðb; /Þ
from each of its s-sets.
Intuitively, if there exists a coordination link between the role enacted by the
informing agent and the role enacted by the recipient, and provided that the
informing agents knows that the to-be-communicated content is going to be the case
in the next state reached by the system ðKa@þ1/Þ, then an inform action always
results in the creation of the corresponding epistemic state in the recipient. A
coordination relation enables thus agents with reliable and trustworthy information
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channels. Typical to-be-communicated contents are obligations to perform some
action in the next state, or information about actions just undertaken.
In analogy with the definition of delegation it is stated that, provided that the
preconditions in the first clause hold, the set of state-transitions generated by a step
st where event a : informðb; /Þ is performed, is the subset of the state-transitions
generated by the step st0 where no a : informðb; /Þ takes place in which all
transitions end up satisfying Kb/.
Definition 4.3 (Semantic constraints for a : monitorðb; aÞ) For any step st and s-
set S such that a : monitorðb; aÞ 2 S and S 2 st (with a; b 2 Ag and a 2 Act) and any
w 2 W:
reachðst; wÞ ¼
fw0 j w0 2 reachðst0; wÞ
and M; w0 
 KaDONEðb : aÞg
if M; w 
 DOðb : aÞ ^ KaOðb : aÞ
and M; w 
 Controlðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ
fw0 j w0 2 reachðst0; wÞ
and M; w0 
 KaDONEðb : aÞ ^ KaOða : aÞg
if M; w 
 DOðb : aÞ ^ KaOðb : aÞ
and M; w 




where st0 is the step obtained from st removing all occurrences of a : monitorðb; aÞ
from each of its s-sets.
Intuitively, if a control relation exists between the role enacted by the monitoring
agent and the one enacted by the monitored agent, and the monitoring agent knows a
certain action ought to be performed by the monitored agent, then the monitor action
is:
– an informative action (Meyer and Van der Hoek 1995), i.e., after the
performance of a : monitorðb; aÞ either KaDONEðb : aÞ _ KaDONEðb : aÞ;
– an action generating a recovery obligation on the monitoring agent, in case the
monitored agent did not performed the action whose performance is checked.
This semantics constraint models therefore the idea that a control link between two
roles on the one hand enables the monitoring agents with the necessary tools and
capabilities for being always able to ascertain whether the action to be checked was
actually performed or not, and on the other it attributes to the monitoring agent tasks
of a recovery kind. Notice that monitor actions are performed in parallel with the to-
be-monitored actions.
Looking at the definition from a more technical point of view, we see again the
same patterns used in Definitions 4.1 and 4.2. If the preconditions in the first clause
hold true, then the set of state-transitions generated by a step s where event
a : monitorðb; aÞ is performed, is the subset of the state-transitions generated by the
step s0 where no a : monitorðb; aÞ takes place in which all transitions end up
satisfying KaDONEðb : /Þ. If the preconditions in the second clause hold true, then
the set of transitions leads to worlds all satisfying 
 KaDONEðb : aÞ ^ KbOba. If
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none of the preconditions hold, the monitor action does not influence the transition
generated by the step.
It is easy to see that Definitions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 make Formulae 9, 10 and 11 in
Table 2 valid in our models.
4.2 Organizational actions and knowledge
We consider organizational actions to be such that their necessary effects are always
known to the agents performing them. In other words, the actions of delegating,
informing, and monitoring, once executed by an agent, always determine the
knowledge about their necessary effects which the agent expects. To use the
terminology of Meyer and Van der Hoek (1995), these actions are always accordant
to plan.
Definition 4.4 (Knowing the effects of organizational actions) If a 2 OrgEvt, then
for any step st s.t. a 2 st:
8w1; w2 : w2 2 Rðst; w1Þ ) ð8w3 : ðw2Kiw3 ) ð9w4 : ðw1Kiw4
& w3 2 Rðst; w4ÞÞÞÞÞ:
with i being the agent of event a.
Intuitively, the constraint guarantees that any world reachable via a concatenation
of the transitions of step st and Ki, is also reachable via a concatenation of Ki and
the transitions generated by s. It can be proven (see Meyer and Van der Hoek 1995)
that such constraint validates Formulae 12, 13 and 14 in Table 2.
4.3 Organizational actions, knowledge, and deontics
Organizational actions are activities by means of which any collective agency can
be managed. As we have seen they are dependent on the organizational structure of
a group. When an agent, given a role-based plan and an enactment configuration, is
Table 2 Validities concerning organizational actions
ðPowerðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ KaOða : aÞÞ
! ½a : delegateðb; aÞOðb : aÞ
(9)
ðCoordðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ Ka@þ1/Þ ! ½a : informðb; /ÞKb/
(10)
ðControlðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ KaOðb : aÞÞ
! ½a : monitorðb; aÞðKaDONEðb : aÞ _ ðKaDONEðb : aÞ
^ KaOða : aÞÞÞ
(11)
Kað½a : delegateðb; aÞwÞ ! ½a : delegateðb; aÞKaw
(12)
Kað½a : informðb; /ÞwÞ ! ½a : informðb; /ÞKaw (13)
Kað½a : monitorðb; aÞwÞ ! ½a : monitorðb; aÞKaw (14)
Oða : delegateðb; aÞÞ ! KaOða : delegateðb; aÞÞ (15)
Oða : informðb; /ÞÞ ! KaOða : informðb; /ÞÞ (16)
Oða : monitorðb; aÞÞ ! KaOða : monitorðb; aÞÞ: (17)
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appointed to perform a certain organizational action we consider reasonable to
assume that it also knows about this appointment. In fact, we consider such
knowledge to follow from the role enactment itself: if an agent enacts a role it
acquires knowledge about its tasks. This motivates the following semantic
constraint.
Definition 4.5 (Knowing about organizational tasks) If a 2 OrgEvt, then for any
step st s.t. a 62 s:
8w1; w2 : ððw2 2 Rðst; w1Þ ) M; w2 
 VÞ ) ð9w3 : w1Kiw3
& w2 2 Rðst; w3ÞÞÞ
with i being the agent of event a.
The constraint states that if all the worlds reachable via st satisfy the violation
constant, then the same worlds are reachable via a concatenation of Ki and
transitions generated by s. It is easy to see that such a constraint makes Formulae 15,
16 and 17 in Table 2 valid.
4.4 Role-based and agent-based plans
Organizations ‘‘represent rationally ordered instruments for the achievement of
stated goals’’ (Selznick 1948), that is, organizations arise in order to achieve
specific objectives, and these objectives are pursued defining a number of subgoals
contributing to the overall purpose of the organization. These subgoals identify the
roles that are played in the organization. The relation between subgoals and overall
objectives of the organization, i.e., the primitive decomposition of tasks within the
organization, defines the essential form of organizational structure: ‘‘viewed in this
light, formal organization is the structural expression of rational action’’ (Selznick
1948). Roles are the basic units over which this structure ranges determining the
source of the ‘‘rational order’’ holding in the organization. The above quotes
consider then the decomposition of tasks as the central source of structure within
organizations: structure is necessary for each organization to pursue its objectives.
In order for the objectives of an organization to be realized the organization needs to
‘‘translate’’ them in concrete sub-goals to be systematically reached following
specific plans, i.e., via complex collective actions which, once performed, guarantee
the achievement of those objectives. Normally, this ‘‘translation’’ of objectives into
plans is described via the two steps of task division and task allocation.
Through the task division process, goals are reduced to complex actions. Notice
that task division consists of two steps. First a raw plan is found, which consists only
of the atomic actions necessary for carrying out the organizational goal at issue:
a1      an
where • stands for one of the event composition operators (so, • [{;,&,+}), for all
1  i  n ai 2 A (we consider thus plans to be spelled out in terms of atomic
actions). In terms of our running example, suppose that the program committee has
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selected the following task division for the notification of acceptance: the chairman
collects the submitted papers and divides the papers among the other PC members;
the PC members review the papers they have received from the chairman and send
their results to the chairman; the chairman makes the final decision which papers are
selected for the workshop and informs the authors about the decision. Such a row
plan does not include all the organizational actions necessary for the program
committee to manage the performance of the plan itself. Coordination actions are
required between the chairman and the PC members (PC members should know
they have to review the papers appointed to them by the chairman) as well as
monitoring actions (the chairman should control all reviewers do their job and
possibly take appropriate counter measures in case of failure). We call raw plans
including all the necessary organizational actions proper plans or simply plans.
Through the task allocation process, each atomic component of the complex
action, which is intended to realize a specific objective of the organization, is
allocated to one agent. Within groups displaying an explicit organizational structure,
the task allocation process consists of two essential steps. First, given a plan, each
action component of the plan is linked to a role of the organization. In this view,
roles are therefore placeholders within a plan description. A plan in which the
atomic action components are indexed with roles identifiers is called role-based
plan and it looks like this:
r1 : a1      rn : an
where • stands for one of the event composition operators (so, • [{;,&,+}), for all
1  i  n ai 2 A and ri 2 AR. Notice that, obviously, different actions can be
indexed with a same role.
The second step in a task allocation consists in the so-called role enactment
specifying which agent of the organization plays which role. Again, different roles
can be enacted by a same agent.8 In this work, agents playing a role in an
organization are called role enacting agents or rea’s. We have already introduced
the notion of role enactment configuration in Definition 3.1 formalized by the
relation Rea in OS structures and representable in LORG via finite conjunctions of
the form:
reaða1; r1Þ ^    ^ reaðai; riÞ ^    ^ reaðan; rnÞ
such that 81  i  n; ai 2 Ag and ri 2 AR.
Given a role-based plan and a role-enactment configuration a corresponding
agent-based plan can be obtained which specifies which agent of the organization
has to play which role in the plan. In other words a role-based plan PlanðAR; sÞ and
a role enactment configuration Rea univocally determine an agent-based plan, i.e., a
complex event description.
8 Schematically, a task allocation given a plan consists of a surjection of the set of roles AR of the
organization onto the set of atomic action components of the plan, followed by a surjection of the set of
agents Ag onto AR, provided that all roles are employed in the task allocation and that all agents enact at
least a role.
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Definition 4.6 (Agent-based plan) An agent-based plan PlanðAg; sÞ for a task s
within the set of agents Ag is a structure:
PlanðAg; sÞ ¼ PlanðAR; sÞ; Reah i
As such, agent-based plans be represented in LORG as an event expression of the
form:
a1 : a1      an : an
where • [{;,&,+}, for all 1  i  n ai 2 A, ai 2 Ag and such that:
– PlanðAg; sÞ is obtained from PlanðAR; sÞ by substitution of the role indexes ri
with the agent indexes ai according to Rea,
– M; w 
 ½a1 : a1      an : ans.
The definition makes explicit the translation step of the organizations’ objective
into concrete plans for groups of agents: from an organizational level (roles) to a
collective agency level (agents). Complex event expressions can be seen as the result
of an instantiation process of role-based plans via role enactment configurations.
4.5 Plans and structure
In the previous section we distinguished between raw plans, i.e., complex action
descriptions not including any organizational action, and proper plans, i.e., complex
action descriptions which include instead organizational actions. The step from raw
plans to proper plans is the most typical feature of planning a collective activity with
respect to planning an individual one. When a plan concerns only the performance
of a single agent, organizational activities such as delegating, informing and
monitoring loose their meaning since those activities just happens within the single
mind of one individual agent. Groups have, instead, no single mind even though
they can act as if they had one precisely by undertaking appropriate organizational
activities. Given a raw plan, an organization always needs to elaborate a
corresponding proper plan which can accordingly manage the knowledge flow
and the control issue within the group.
As we have seen in Sect. 4.1, organizational actions require, in order to be
successful, specific structural constraints among the roles of the organization and
specific enactment configurations. So, if an agent-based plan requires a certain agent
a to inform agent b about / then a suitable coordination link between the roles
enacted by a and b should be put in place, or otherwise the information action could
fail in transferring the necessary knowledge to b. Analogously, if an agent-based
plan requires a to monitor the performance of b with respect to action a, a suitable
control link between the roles enacted by a and b should be effective, or otherwise
the monitoring action could fail not creating the necessary knowledge in a. These
observations have precise formal counterparts. In fact, it can easily be seen that if
the suitable structural links and enactment configurations do not hold, the following
formulae are satisfiable in the models for LORG:
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DOða : informðb; /ÞÞ ^ :½a : informðb; /Þ/ ð18Þ
DOða : monitorðb; aÞÞ ^ :½a : monitorðb; aÞðKaDONEðb : aÞ
_ ðKa:DONEðb : aÞ ^ KaOða : aÞÞÞ:
ð19Þ
Satisfiability of such formulae can be seen as a sign of faulty design of the
organization, where the organizational structure is not tuned on the organizational
activities needed for managing the collective agency.
There is however another face of the coin. Given a desired plan, a suitable
organizational structure can be designed or, vice versa, given an organizational
structure, appropriate plans can be designed to meet the objectives of the
organization. Proper plans can be chosen on the basis of the available structural
links and enactment configuration. The delegation activity can play an essential role
in this sense, improving given plans via attributing tasks to more suitable agents.
Again, this cannot successfully happen without appropriate structural links, and
Formulae 18 and 19 have a delegation variant:
DOða : delegateðb; bÞÞ ^ :½a : delegateðb; bÞOðb : bÞ ð20Þ
which is also satisfiable if no power link is put in place.
5 Responsibilities in form
5.1 Causal responsibility
An agent ai is said to be causally responsible for a state of affairs / by performing a
iff it performs an action a whose necessary effect is the state of affairs / and it is not
the case that if it did not perform a then / was anyway the case.
Definition 5.1 (Causal responsibility) The causal responsibility of ai 2 Ag for /
by performing a is defined as follows:
CausalRðai; /; aÞ :¼ @1ð½ai : a/ ^ :½ai : a/ ^ DOðai : aÞÞ
Intuitively, ai has just performed a in the last step of the run of the system and /
would have not been necessary the case if a was not performed by ai.
9 In other
words, in the very previous state in the run the occurrence of / marked the
performance of a by ai and an event of type ai : a has led to the actual state (in
which the causal responsibility is evaluated). A similar notion has been formalized,
making use of a ‘‘bringing-it-about’’ modal logic, in Cholvy et al. (1997).
A particularly relevant case of causal responsibility is the causal responsibility
for a violation. Such a notion is formalized by expressions of the form
CausalRðai; V; aÞ.
9 It might be worth recollecting that ½½ai : a ¼ ½½ai : a.
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5.2 Blameworthiness
An agent which is causally responsible, may not be considered blameworthy. For
example, if the chairman of the Editorial Board has forgotten to inform a member ai
to review some papers in one week, and agent ai did not review the papers in one
week, then the achievement of the goal of the Editorial Board to notify of the results
of the reviews within the deadline will not be met. The agent would be considered
causally responsible, but it would not be considered blameworthy. An agent does
something causally blameworthy, if it is causally responsible and if it knows that the
action it performs leads to a violation which could be avoided by not performing the
action.
Definition 5.2 (Blameworthiness) Blameworthiness of ai 2 Ag for / by perform-
ing a is defined as follows:
Blame ðai; V ; aÞ :¼ CausalRðai; V ; aÞ ^@1Kaið½ai : aV ^ :½ai : aV ^ DOðai : aÞÞ:
That is to say, ai is blameworthy iff it is causally responsible of V and it knew in
the very previous state of the run that the performance of a would have resulted in
the occurrence of V.
5.3 Task-based responsibility
The notion of task-based responsibility corresponds to the notion of duty and refers
to what the individuals of the organization are expected to do in virtue of their roles.
As proposed also in Conte and Paolucci (2004), we assume task-based responsibility
to be a consequence of role enactment. As we have seen, a role-based plan together
with an enactment configuration univocally determines an agent-based plan. An
agent who accepts to play a given role in an organization takes a responsibility with
regard to the accomplishment of that role, i.e., with the tasks associated to it Conte
and Paolucci (2004).
Definition 5.3 (Task-based responsibility) An agent ai 2 Ag is task-based
responsible for action ai iff there exists a to-be-executed agent-based plan
PlanjðAg; sÞ ¼ a1 : a1      ai : ai      an : an, that is, iff there subsists an





where PLðai : aÞ is the set of all finite plans having event ai : a as one of their
components.
In other words, an agent is task-based responsible for the performance of a given
action iff the event ai : ai is part of the to-be-executed agent-based plan.
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Definition 5.3 has interesting consequences concerning the relation between the
notion of obligation and of task-based responsibility itself which can all be
expressed in our language. First of all, task-based responsibility occurs in the very
moment (situation, possible world) in which an obligation to execute a plan occurs
which contains the relevant event (Formula 21). Besides, notice that task-based
responsibility holds true at every execution stage of a plan (Formula 22) at least
until the relevant event is performed for the last time (Formula 23).
Proposition 5.1 (TaskR and O) Given a sequential plan Plan(Ag,s) = a1: a1 ; ... ;
ai:ai ; ... ; an: an in which all events are different from each other, the following are
validities of our framework:
OðPlanðAg; sÞÞ ! TaskRðai; aÞ; ð21Þ
OðPlanðAg; sÞÞ ! ½a1 : a1TaskRðai; aiÞ^
   ^ ½a1 : a1; . . . ; ai1 : ai1TaskR
ðai; aiÞ; ð22Þ
:ðOðPlanðAg; sÞÞ ! ½a1 : a1; . . . ; ai : aiTaskRðai; aiÞÞ: ð23Þ
Proof 5.1 Formula 21 follows directly from Definition 5.3. Formula 22 follows
again from Definition 5.3, Formula 7 and Formula 21. Formula 23 is proven since
t h e r e a l w a y s e x i s t s a m o d e l s a t i s f y i n g
OðPlanðAg; sÞÞ ^ :½a1 : a1; . . . ; ai : aiTaskRðai; aiÞ, which intuitively corresponds
to the model in which the task-based responsibility ceases to hold after the
execution of the relevant event. h
Formulae 21 and 23 deserve in particular some more words. It is worth noticing why
Definition 5.3 guarantees the persistence of the responsibility through the execution of
the plan. That depends on the fact that after each execution of a fragment of the plan a
new obligation with respect to the rest of the plan holds (see Formula 7). And as far as
these new obligations hold for plans which include the event concerning the task-based
responsibility, that responsibility also holds. As soon as the event is performed,
persistence is not guaranteed any more. As a matter of fact, it would be desirable to have
a s t r o n g e r v e r s i o n o f F o r m u l a 2 3 s u c h a s
OðPlanðAg; sÞÞ ! ½a1 : a1; . . . ; ai : ai:TaskRðai; aiÞÞ. However, this last version is
not a validity since we cannot rule out the possibility of violation constants holding also
in those worlds reached via correct executions of the plan. Obligations just state that if
certain actions are not performed, a violation necessarily occurs (Definition 3.11), but
they do not exclude that violations can hold no matter what actions are performed.
5.4 Accountability
The notion of accountability concerns the interplay of causal and task-based
responsibilities. We say that an agent is accountable for a violation if it caused the
violation by performing an action a and if it was appointed to a according to the
plan that had to be executed at the beginning of the run. This notion is necessary
because of the organizational actions of delegation and monitor which can lead to
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the generation of new tasks throughout a run of the system which are different from
the one attributed by the original plan at the beginning of the run. In other words, the
original task allocation established at the beginning of the run of the system is the
one used for assessing accountability. These considerations are captured in the
following definition.
Definition 5.4 (Accountability) An agent ai 2 Ag is accountable for a violation V
by performing a iff it is blameworthy for V by performing a and it was, at the initial
state of the run, task-based responsible for the execution a:
AccountRðai; V ; aÞ :¼ Blameðai; V ; aÞ ^@startTaskRðai; aÞ
It might be interesting to spend a few words about the intuitive meanings of the
two expressions TaskRðai; aÞ and @startTaskRðai; aÞ. The first formula can be read
as ‘‘agent ai will have sooner or later to perform a’’. The second formula captures
the idea of an initial appointment of a task: ‘‘agent ai has been appointed, according
to the initial plan, to the performance of a’’. Notice that neither the first implies the
second nor the second implies the first. They formalize logically unrelated notions.
In fact, I can have a task even if I was not appointed to it by the initial plan, for
instance because I have been addressee of a delegation action. On the other hand, if
I was appointed to a task this does not imply that I have that task at the current state,
because I have for instance already performed the required action.
5.5 Responsibilities and organizational structure
In this section we show how our analysis provides a way for understanding the
influence of organizational structure on the various notions of responsibility
formalized in the previous section.
First of all we show a quite obvious result, namely that the existence of a power
structure can determine the occurrence of a causal responsibility if the addressee of
a delegation act does not perform the required action. This is no surprise since we
know (Definition 4.1) that the existence of a power structure determines the
successful creation of directed obligations via delegation.
Proposition 5.2 (The power structure is grounds for CausalR) Let a; b 2 Ag,
r; s 2 AR and a; b 2 A. The following formula is a validity of our framework:
ð@1@1ðPowerðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ KaOða : bÞ
^ DOða : delegateðb; bÞÞ ^@1DOðb : bÞ ^ :½b : bVÞ
! CausalR ðb; V; bÞ
ð24Þ
Proof 5.2 We show that there is no countermodel of Formula 24, that is no model
that makes the antecedent of Formula 24 true and the consequent false. A
countermodel M should be such that 9w1; w2; w3: w3  w2  w1 and
M; w3 
 Powerðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ KaOða : bÞ; for Definition 4.1 and
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t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f K a , M; w2 
 DONEða : delegateðb; bÞ ^ Oðb : bÞ ^ :
½b : bV ^ DOðb : bÞ; and finally the consequent should be false, that is,
M; w1 
 :@1ð½b : bV ^ :½b : bV ^ DOðb : bÞÞ which cannot be the case is given
Definition 3.11 and Definition 5.1. h
On the other hand a power structure is not enough for determining accountability.
In fact, accountability depends on the initial task-allocation assumed by the
organization and it is not influenced by the creation of new obligations which do not
stem from that task-allocation.
Proposition 5.3 (The power structure is not grounds for AccountR) Let a; b 2 Ag,
r; s 2 AR and a; b 2 A. The following formula is satisfiable in the logic:
@1@1ðPowerðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ Oða : bÞ
^ DOða : delegateðb; bÞÞ ^Blame ðb; V ; bÞ ^ :AccountR ðb; V; bÞ ð25Þ
Proof 5.3 The desired model is a model M such that there exists a world w:
M; w 
 :@startTaskRðb : bÞ. h
The following proposition shows that the occurrence of blameworthiness requires
the existence of a coordination structure, which is instead not relevant for the
occurrence of causal responsibility.
Proposition 5.4 (Structural conditions for Blame w.r.t. CausalR) Let a; b 2 Ag,
r; s 2 AR and a; b 2 A. The following are validities of the framework:
@1ðKbDOðb : bÞ ^ Kb:½b : bV ^ Oðb : bÞ
! CausalR ðb; V ; bÞ; ð26Þ
ð@1ðKbDOðb : bÞ ^ Kb:½b : bV ^ Oðb : bÞÞ
^@1@1ðCoordðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ
^ Ka@þ1Oðb : bÞ ^ DOða : informðb; Oðb : bÞÞÞÞÞ
! Blame ðb; V ; bÞ:
ð27Þ
Proof 5.4 Proofs are given showing that countermodels are impossible. The
negation of Formula 26 immediately results in a contradiction since the Kb operator
obeys reflexivity (Kb/ ! /). Formula 27 is considerably more complex but it is not
difficult to show that its negation also results in an inconsistent formula. Since the
antecedent of Formula 27 implies the antecedent of Formula 26, a countermodel M
f o r F o r m u l a 2 7 s h o u l d c o n t a i n a w o r l d w 1 s . t .
M; w1 
 CausalRðb; V ; bÞ ^ :ð@1Kbð½b : bV ^ :½b : bV ^ DOðb : bÞÞÞ f r o m
which it follows, given what is stated to hold in the antecedent, that
M; w1 
 :KbOðb : bÞ. However the antecedent states that 9w2; w3 s:t:
w3  w2  w1 and M; w3 
 Coordðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ ^ Ka@þ1Oðb : bÞ
and, thanks to Definition 4.2, M; w2 
 KbOðb : bÞ, which is impossible. h
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Formula 27 deserves in particular some more words. We see that in order to
obtain blameworthiness the same condition determining causal responsibility is first
of all required (first conjunct of the antecedent). The second conjunct of the
antecedent states something about two steps backward in the run (@1@1). In that
state an appropriate coordination configuration needs to be in place, and the
informing agent should know that in the next state (i.e., one state backward in the
run from the evaluation state) an obligation holds for the recipient of the
information action. This complex statement is, thanks to the semantics of the
information actions (Definition 4.2), guarantees that the recipient knows it is obliged
and it therefore determines the necessary conditions for blameworthiness.
Finally we show that the control structure can determine the occurrence of new
task-based responsibilities. If an agent is found to be causally responsible for a
violation by not performing b, then if an appropriate control structure is in place and
a monitor action is performed to check whether b has been performed then the
monitoring agent becomes task-based responsible for that action.
Proposition 5.5 (The control structure is grounds for TaskR) Let a; b 2 Ag,
r; s 2 AR and a; b 2 A. The following is a validity of the framework:
CausalR ðb; V; bÞ ^@1ðControlðr; sÞ ^ reaða; rÞ ^ reaðb; sÞ
^ DOða : monitorðb : bÞÞ ! TaskR ða; bÞ ð28Þ
Proof 5.5 The formula is easily proven considering Definition 4.3, Definition 5.1
and Definition 5.3. h
Other results of this kind are obtainable in the framework. Our aim in this section
was to provide a satisfactory sample of some intuitive relations among the concepts
of responsibility and organizational structure which find a natural formalization in
the framework.
6 Related work
The work presented in this paper moves from a number of precise ideas about the
notion of responsibility within organization. Responsibility, in its various senses, is
related with the notions of obligations and knowledge which, within organized
groups of agents, are in turn related to three essential aspects of organized agency:
– the notions of objectives and plans (and therefore task division and task
allocation) of the organization;
– the organizational actions of delegating, informing and monitoring, that is to
say, with the issue of the management of the collective activity;
– the notions of role, organizational structure, role-enacting agent.
This perspective is essentially different from the work on formalization of
responsibilities and other organization-related concepts presented in Cholvy et al.
(1997) and Santos et al. (1997). In those works a more abstract view on
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organizations is assumed as starting point. As explicitly stated in Santos et al.
(1997), organizations are viewed there as ‘‘instances of normative systems’’, i.e., as
agents’ interaction patterns obeying the rules stated by a normative system.
Organizations, and therefore responsibilities, are analyzed from the point of view of
the rules to which the organized group of agents is subjected. We consider this
perspective perfectly legitimate and sound. However, it would not suit our purposes.
In fact, in our work we were not interested in the normative systems of which an
organization is an instance, but on the structures of the organization itself which are
one of the possible instances of a normative system. In a sense, we abstracted from
the rules and we looked more concretely at their results, i.e., the organizational
structures that the rules can impose on a group of agents. That is why organizational
structures are a first-class citizen in our framework. By doing this we can better
characterize what the effect of those structures, which are specified by rules, are on
the activities of agents. This emerges clearly from the formal treatment of actions in
our work and in Cholvy et al. (1997 and Santos et al. (1997). While we were able to
handle in quite fine-grained details the notion of plan having at disposals sets of
atomic actions, in those works agents’ activities are captured via ‘‘bringing-it-
about’’ modal constructs and organizational activities (in particular delegation) are
described via modal operators modeling forms of indirect action or influence
(‘‘bringing-it-about indirectly that’’).
We deem worth stressing, however, that the two approaches are perfectly
bridgeable, the bridge being the way sets of rules defines sets of organizational
structures. This is very interesting topic which is worth future researches.
7 Conclusions
The work has provided an analysis of some elementary notions of responsibility in
connection with the structure of an organization. The study of the relations between
these two notions showed what are the structural requirements grounding specific
notions of responsibilities and, conversely, what kind of responsibilities can be
assessed on the basis of a given structure. Such results can provide useful hints on
possible guidelines for the design of agents’ organizations exhibiting desirable
properties.
Future work will focus on a yet more detailed semantic characterization of the
organizational actions and of the structures on which they are funded, and on the
study of more of these actions (for instance ‘‘committing’’) possibly making use of
work based on similar formalisms such as, for instance, (Dunin-Keplicz and
Verbrugge 2002) which provides an analysis of collective commitments in a
dynamic logic settings. Another point worth of future developments is the
introduction of a temporal dimension in relation with the notion of obligation,
following the work done in Dignum et al. (2004) and Broersen et al. (2004). This
would allow for a more flexible specification of plans and of the obligations for their
executions. It could at the same time provide insights also in the phenomenon of the
dynamics of responsibilities which has not been addressed in this work.
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